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Molloy: "Must
The Paleface Pay To Puff?" Confederated Salish And Kootenai v. Moe
"MUST

THE PALEFACE PAY TO PUFF?"'
CONFEDERATED SALISH AND KOOTENAI V. MOE
Donald W. Molloy
INTRODUCTION

April 13, 1972 was not a good day for businessman Joseph Anthony
Wheeler, Jr. Wheeler was the owner of two small but thriving discount
cigarette stores. On that day, deputies from the Missoula County
Sheriff's Department appeared at one store and arrested Wheeler for
selling cigarettes (a) without a state license, and (b) without a state
tax stamp affixed to each pack. The deputies stripped cigarette signs
from the doors of the store, and subsequently confiscated 1,350 cartons
of cigarettes. At the other store, the storekeeper employed by Wheeler
was arrested on similar grounds by deputies from the Lake County
Sheriff's Department. Wheeler was an enrolled tribal Indian living on
the Flathead Reservation. The stores were on tracts of tribal trust
land leased from the tribe, and were located within the boundaries of
the Reservation.
From the time of Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Worcester v.
Georgia,2 courts have been called upon to "reconcile the plenary power
of the states over residents within their borders with the semi-autonomous
status of Indians living on tribal Reservations. ' 3 On the present facts.
a federal court was again called, this time to determine Montana's
power to tax cigarette sales on the Flathead Reservation.
TIE CASE
The case came before the federal court as Confederated Salish and
Kootenai v. Moe.4 The plaintiffs, including the Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes, the Tribal Chairman, and the two persons arrested,
alleged that the Montana cigarette tax and licensing statutes, as applied
to enrolled Indians residing on the Flathead Reservation, were unconstitutional and a violation of tribal sovereignty. The defendants contended that the State of Montana had the power to compel an Indian
residing on the Flathead Reservation to collect the state's cigarette tax
at the time of retail sale of the cigarettes.
Because of the special nature of the case, 5 a three judge federal

'The title of this article is a paraphrase of the rhetorical question posed by dissenting
District Judge Smith in the principal case when he asked "Must the fee-patent Indian
pay to puff ". Confederated Salish and Kootenal v. Moe, 31 St. Rep. 408, 430 n. 3
(1974).
2
Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Peters) 515 (1832).
'McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
'Confederated Salish and Kootenai v. Moe, supra note 1.

1C.
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Speaking of 28 U.S.C. § 2281, Professor Wright says
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court was convened to hear the matter. The court held that it had jurisdiction, and proceded to consider the merits. Two issues were distinguished:
(1) Does Montana have the power to tax cigarettes sold by an
Indian retailer to Indian customers on Reservation land?
(2) Does Montana have the power to require an Indian retailer to
collect a tax for the state on cigarettes sold to non-Indian customer on
Reservation land?
I. The first issue which had to be confronted was whether or not
the Montana statutes' were unconstitutional as applied to the sale of
cigarettes by an Indian retailer to Indian customers on Reservation
land. Because the State of Montana had assumed limited civil jurisdiction7 and exclusive criminal jurisdiction s over the Flathead Reservation two immediate questions had to be resolved. The court had to
decide whether the Montana cigarette tax and licensing statutes were
criminal in nature, and if not, whether the power to license cigarette
dealers and tax cigarette sales was assumed under the limited civil jurisdiction the state could exercise over the Flathead Reservation. The
court observed:
... .taxing statutes are civil revenue collecting provisions even
though they are subject to being enforced by criminal penalties.
If the civil revenue collecting provisions are not applicable to the

plaintiffs in the first instance, then neither are their criminal enforcement provisions.'
It thus found that the power to enforce cigarette and licensing statutes
was not among the limited catagories of civil jurisdiction assumed by
the state.
Relying almost exclusively on the United States Supreme Court's
reasoning in McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona,' ° the three
judge court held that the Montana statute was unconstitutional as applied
to enrolled Reservation Indians selling cigarettes to other Reservation
Indians."
The narrow ground upon which McClanahan was decided appeared
to adapt readily to the Montana factual context holding that the activities of an Indian cigarette user on reservation land were beyond the
state's power to tax.

statute or administrative order must be challenged, a state officer must be a party
defendant, injunctive relief must be sought, and it must be claimed that the statute
or order is contrary to the constitution of the Unied States."
OREviSED CODES OF MONTANA, §§ 84-5606, 84-5606.2(j)
(1947) [Hereinafter cited as
R.C.M. 1947].
1R.C.M. 1947, § 83-801 et. seq.
8
State ex rel. McDonald v. Dist. Court, 159 Mont. 156, 496 P.2d 78 (1972).
9
Confederated Salish and Kootenai v. Moe, supra note 1 at 419.
"McClanahan v. State Tax Commn of Arizona, supra note 3.
"Confederated Salish and Kootenai v. Moe, supra note 1 at 421.
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II. The Confederated Salish and Kootenai court was confronted with
a more perplexing question in the second issue which it faced. It noted
that ". . . the Supreme Court has not passed upon the question here
1 2
presented."'
It had to determine whether the State of Montana was
precluded from requiring a member of the Tribes to pre-collect the tax
if he wished to sell cigarettes to non-Indians on the Flathead Reservation.
The language of the Montana statutes was the basis of the quandary,
as the cigarette tax is conclusively presumed to be a direct tax on the
retail customer and pre-collected for convenience only.' 3 The seller pays
the tax to the wholesaler and in turn adds the tax to the purchase price
of the cigarettes. The result is that in the sale without payment of the
tax to a non-Indian, it is the non-Indian who reaps the benefits of the
tax exemption, not the Indian seller.
In arriving at a solution of this problem the court discussed the
federal pre-emption principles and federal regulation of Indian trading.
It compared this case to Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Commission,14 and noted that unlike the Navajo Reservation, the Flathead Reservation had no licensed Indian Traders. 15 Thus a longstanding congressional policy of avoiding a burden of state taxation on persons licensed
by the federal government to trade with the Indians was not a factor
for consideration. Additionally, the court recognized that the doctrine
of Indian sovereignty was not an inflexible or static doctrine but that
"notions of Indian Sovereignty have been adjusted to take account of
the state's legitimate interests in regulating the affairs of non-Indians."' 176
Reasoning further on the basis of Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,
holding that Indian Tribes were not totally immune from state taxation,
it set forth the ground for an inference that a uniform non-discriminatory
tax or obligation might be imposed.
The court resolved that the Indian retailer selling cigarettes to nonIndians is involved with non-Indians to a degree which would permit
Montana to exercise its power and require the pre-collection of the tax
imposed on non-Indians. Quite plainly the court had determined that
this factual situation was easily within the inroads made on Indian
Sovereignty set forth in Williams.'5 The court reasoned that (1) the
collection of the tax would impose no burden on the class of reservation
Indians, (2) that the collection of the tax would not interfere with the

"Id. at 425.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 84-5606(1). "All taxes paid pursuant to the provisions of this section
shall be conclusively presumed to be direct taxes on the retail consumer pre-collected
for the purpose of convenience and facility only."
"Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
-25 U.S.C. §§ 261-264 (1970).

"Confederated Salish and Kootenai v. Moe, supra note 1 at 423 quoting McClanahan
v. State Tax Comm'n of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
'Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973),
'Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959).
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Tribe's right to be governed by its own laws, and (3) that it appeared
to be a reasonable inference that the stores were established, not for the
sole benefit of the Indian customers, but to attract prospective customers
who were non-Indians but who could take advantage of not paying the
cigarette tax by buying from the Reservation stores. 19
Thus the three-judge court held that Montana could not apply the
cigarette excise tax to the sale of cigarettes by a member of the Tribes
to any Indian residing on the Reservation. Nor could the state require
any member of the Tribe selling cigarettes on the Reservation to obtain
a dealer's license. However, the State of Montana could require the
Indian seller to pre-collect the excise tax on any sale made to a non20
Indian.
THE OTIlER CASES
The cases involving Indian parties should not be categorically
classed as "Indian Cases" if in so doing one overlooks fundamental differences of legal relationships. To apply the logical method of reductio
ad absurdum to such a proposition would lead to the untenable conclusion
that legal status can be equated with race. Thus, before considering the
"cigarette tax" question further, it is necessary to provide a reference
point based on four recent Supreme Court cases involving the legal
relation of the state and Indian persons residing within its borders.
(1)
Williams v. Lee.21 This case involved a licensed Indian Trader
who was a non-Indian, selling at retail on the Reservation to Indian buyers.
The Court held that the state courts of Arizona did not have jurisdiction
in a suit to collect for goods sold to the Indian buyers because jurisdiction was in the tribal court. To allow the state to exercise jurisdiction would undermine the authority of tribal courts over Reservation
affairs and would infringe on the right of Indians to govern themselves.
(2) Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Commission.22 This case
involved a licensed Indian Trader whose income from trading with Reservation Indians on the Reservation was subjected to a tax by the State
of Arizona. The Court held that the state could not impose the tax
burden on the trader or the Indians because the field of trading with
Indians on Reservations was occupied by all-inclusive Congressional
statutes and regulations.
(3) Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones. 23 The Supreme Court held
that New Mexico could impose a non-discriminatory gross receipts tax
on a ski resort operated by the tribe on land without the exterior boundaries of the Reservation. However, the state could not impose a use
"Confederated Salish and Kootenai v. Moe, supra note 1 at 427.
'Id. at 428.
2Williams v. Lee, sura note 18.
'Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, supra note 14.
mWescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra note 17.
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tax on personalty installed as a permanent improvement at the resort
which had become so intimately connected with the land that it was
entitled to statutory exemption.
(4) McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission.24 Here the Court
held that the State of Arizona could not impose its personal income tax
on the income of an enrolled Tribal Indian residing on the Reservation
whose income was wholly derived from a Reservation source.
With this reference point the treatment of the cigarette tax issue
by other state and federal courts can be considered.
A. Tonasket. The cigarette tax question presented before the federal
court in Montana is not sui generis. The question has been raised in two
other states, Washington and Nevada, within the past few years. It was
first litigated in the State of Washington in the case of Tonasket v.
State25 and involved a factual situation remarkably similar to the facts
of the case considered by the Confederated Salish and Kootenai court.
In Tonasket a full blooded Colville Indian who owned and operated
a retail cigarette store on alloted Reservation land was arrested for
admittedly violating the Washington statutes26 requiring him to obtain
a license to sell cigarettes and to affix the state's tax stamp to cigarettes
he sold. He showed no discrimination in his sales, he sold to Indian and
non-Indian alike. The Washington supreme court held that the state
had assumed jurisdiction under Public Law 28027 and that the state's
jurisdiction extended to all matters except those enumerated limitations
contained in that act. Reasoning then that it was the intent of Congress
to authorize states to apply their revenue laws to business activities of
Indians because
*

.

. there is expressed in the act no other limitation upon the right

of the state to impose taxes upon and regulate the activities of an

Indian under its general laws applicable to all citizens ....

there

is no room to imply other limitations upon the operation of the
general laws of the state.'
The court specifically noted that Warren was not conclusive authority because Tonasket did not involve a licensed Indian Trader and more
importantly the Navajos had not submitted to the jurisdiction of Arizona
nor had Arizona assumed jurisdiction over them.
Mr. Tonasket appealed the Washington court's ruling and the United
States Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. At the time the case
was brought before the Supreme Court there were two other2 9 Indian
24

McClanahan v. State Tax Comm 'n of Arizona, supra note 3.
5Tonasket v. State, 79 Wash. 2d 607, 488 P.2d 281 (1971) vacated, 411 U.S. 451 (1973).
2"REVISED CODE OF WASHINGTON ANNOTATED, §§ 19.91.120, 82.24.050, 82.32.030 (1962)
[Hereinafter cited as R.C.W. 1962].
"'Act of August 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588.
"Tonasket v. State, supra note 25 at 285.
"Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra note 17 and McClanahan v. Arizona Tax
Comm'n, supra note 3.
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tax questions pending. Additionally the Washington state legislature
had undertaken an amending of the statutes concerned.80 As a result,
in a per curiam opinion, 31 the Supreme Court vacated the Washington
judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its
opinions in the other tax cases and the Washington legislature's action.
On reconsideration the Washington court reaffirmed3 2 its earlier
holding that the State of Washington had the authority to extend its
civil excise taxes to Indian retailers selling to non-Indians within the
exterior boundaries of the Colville Reservation. However the court went
on to say that the legislative exemption8 3 adopted by the state relieved the
Indian retailers from collecting the tax in sales made to non-Indian
customers.
B. Moses. Prior to the disposition of the state law questions by the
Washington court in Tonasket, a similar question was before the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Moses v. Kinnear.34 Like Tonasket,
Moses involved the Washington cigarette tax statutes. Unlike the activity undertaken in Tonasket, the cigarette sales in Moses were without
the exterior boundaries of the Reservation, yet on Indian trust land.
The Ninth Circuit noted ". . . while McClanahan would prevent the
imposition of a state excise tax on the sale of cigarettes by a member
of the tribe to Indians on the Reservation, it does not reach the question
of imposition of such a tax on sales to non-Indians.' '35 (Emphasis added).
Moses was remanded to the federal district court pending the final
determination of Tonasket by the state court.
C. Walker River Paiute. In Walker River Paiute Tribe v. Sheehan,86
the federal court in Nevada considered the cigarette tax question. Unlike
Confederated Salish and Kootenai, Moses, and Tonasket, Walker River
Paiute was similar to the factual situttion involved in Warren. The
retail seller was a duly licensed Indian Trader who leased from the
Walker River Paiute Tribe a store on Reservation land which he operated as a smoke shop. The cigarettes he sold were unstamped and there-

-R.C.W. 1962, § 82.24.250. ''For purposes of this section, the term 'person authorized
by chapter 82.24 R.C.M. to possess unstamped cigarettes' shall mean a wholesaler or
retailer licensed pursuant ato the provisions of chapter 19.91 R.C.W., the United States
or an agency thereof, and any Indian Tribal organization authorized to possess anstamped cigarettes." (Emphasis added).
§82.24.260. "Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, a person may
acquire and physically possess, if acquired and possessed for purposes other than resale, four hundred or less cigarettes at any single time without incurring tax liability
under this chapter, R.C.W. 28A.47.440 and R.C.W. 73.32.130.
'Tonasket v. State, 411 U.S. 451 (1973).
'Tonasket v. State, ......
Wash. 2d ........
, 525 P.2d 744, 754 (1974).
mId. at 755.
' 4Moses v. Kinnear, 490 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1974).
mId. at 26.

'Walker River Paiute Tribe v. Sheehan, 370 F. Supp. 816 (D. Nevada 1973).
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fore in violation of a Nevada law.37 Again, his sales were non-discriminatory.
The court in Nevada noted that perhaps the most significant aspect
of McClanahan was its reaffirmation of Warren.35 Significantly this court
held that a decision protecting from state taxation sales to non-Indians
was not precluded by Warren or McClanahanbecause neither had reached
the question. Nor did the Supreme Court's decision in Mescalero preclude
placing sales to non-Indians outside the state's power to tax.3 9
CONCLUSION
To reconcile the cases it is necessary to note the myriad factual
permutations and nuances. The three-judge holding in Montana is consistent with the ultimate determination by the Washington court in
Tonasket. Both Montana and Washington had assumed limited jurisdiction respectively over the Flathead and Colville Reservations. Similarly the tax sought to be enforced was a tax on the retail consumer
rather than the Indian seller or trader in both cases, though Montana's
statutory language is likely to bear less scrutiny than the Washington
exception 40 should either statute be the subject of the litigation in the
future. Though reaching different conclusions concerning the imposition
of the tax on sales made to non-Indians, the Montana case did not involve a licensed Indian Trader as did the Nevada case. Additionally the
Nevada tax was on an activity undertaken on the Reservation whereas
Montana's tax is presumed to be a tax on the purchaser.
The holding in Confederated Salish and Kootenai, is the only case
in which a federal court has determined that a state can require an Indian
retail seller to pre-collect a state tax on cigarettes sold to non-Indians.
Like the holdings of McClanahan and Warren,41 the holding of Confederated Salish and Kootenai is likely to be very limited in its application. It is unlikely that, absent a legislative exception similar to that
in the Washington statute, 42 the court's interpretation of the Montana
statute would stand if the same issue arose on any of the other reservations in the state. This premise is based on the fact that the Flathead
Reservation is the only Indian Reservation in the state in which Montana has assumed jurisdiction, even though in a limited sense, in civil

8

'Nevada Revised Statutes, § 370.270 (1973) [Hereinafter cited N.R.S. 1973].
8Walker River Paiute Tribe v. Sheehan, supra note 36 at 821.
"Id. at 822.
- 4R.C.M. 1947, § 84-5606, is a conclusive presumption so the federal decision is likely to
be determinative even if the matter should come before the state court. R.C.W. 1962,
§ 82.24.260, operates only when the non-Indian purchaser buys less than two cartons
of cigarettes. It would appear that if the non-Indian purchaser buys more than two
cartons at one time the question litigated and appealed to the United States Supreme
Court in Tonasket will again be at hand.
"Walker River Paiute Tribe v. Sheehan, supra note 36 at 821.
"See R.C.W. 1962, § 82.24.250, supra note 30.
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matters. It is equally as unlikely that the case will stand as authority
in any other case excepting those with a precise factual similarity.
The four cigarette tax cases suggest that it is possible to identify
some key questions which must be considered when one is confronted
with a jurisdictional issue concerning the state's power to tax Indian
citizens.
1. Has the state assumed civil 43 or criminal 44 jurisdiction either under Public Law 280 or Title IV of the 1968 Civil Rights Act ?45
2. If the state has assumed civil jurisdiction, does it extend to the
46
power to tax?
47
3. Is there a federal statute or treaty prohibiting or authorizing
48
the state to exercise the power to tax?
4. What is the nature of the tax? Is it a tax on the activity or is
it a tax on a use?49
5. Is the nature of the activity engaged in tribal or is it an individual endeavor? 50
6. Where does the activity take place? Is it within the exterior
boundaries of the Reservation on land allotted to the individual tribal
member or is it on land held in trust for the tribe ?51 Is it without the
52
exterior boundaries on trust land?
7. What is the status of the individual undertaking the activity?
Is he enrolled in the tribe and living on the Reservation? 53 Is there
4
a special status such as an Indian Trader ?
"Note, State Civil Jurisdiction Over Tribal Indians A Be-Examination, 35 MONT. L.
REV. 340 (1974).
"State ex rel. McDonald v. Dist. Court, supra note 8.
-25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1970). See Kennerly v. Dist. Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971);
also Security State Bank v. Pierre, ...... Mont ....... , 511 P.2d 325, 30 St. Rep. 482
(1973).
"Tonasket v. State, supra note 32.
'425 U.S.C. §§ 261-264 (1970).
OMescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra note 17; McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, supra note 3; Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, supra note 14.
"Id.
51It would appear that if the Tribal organization acts to make the activity a tribal
revenue producing activity, it would sufficiently affect the status of the parties to
the extent that the Williams general test becomes more exclusive, ending to diminish
the state's jurisdictional base. Another factor affecting the status is whether the
individual involved can effectuate a statutory exemption, such as the Indian Trader
status resulting in the state's jurisdictional interest being further diminished. As an
example see the Colville Tobacco Ordinance, 37 Fed. Reg. 25181 at 25182 (1972).
"Confederated Salish and Kootenai v. Moe, supra note 1; also Tonasket v. State, supra
note 32.
5Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra note 17; also Moses v. Kinnear, supra note 34.
"Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra note 17; Warren Trading Post v. Arizona
Tax Comm'n, supra note 14; Williams v. Lee, supra note 18; see also State ex rel.
Mont ...... , 512 P.2d 1292, 30 St. Rep. 482 (1973)
Mary Iron Bear v. Dist. Court, ----and Bad Horse v. Bad Horse, ...... Mont. ....... , 517 P.2d 893, 31 St. Rep. 22 (1974).
-25 U.S.C. §§ 261-264 (1970). An inference can be drawn from the statutory language
of 25 U.S.C. § 264 such that a full blooded Indian involved in retail sales to Indians
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8. Does the operation of the tax pertain exclusively to Indians or
are there non-Indians involved to such a degree that there is a legitimate
state interest?55
It is clear that despite the seeming inroads on the doctrine of Indian
sovereignty noted in Williams v. Lee, 56 the doctrine is still a fundamental
consideration in resolving the state tribal jurisdictional conflict. Though
the test ". . . has always been whether the state action infringed on the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them", 57 it should be considered in light of Justice Marshall's caveat in
McClanahan.
. . . it could vastly oversimplify the problem to say that nothing
remains of the notion that reservation Indians are a separate people
to whom state jurisdiction, and therefore state tax legislation may
not extend.'

EPILOGUE
On the basis of a lengthy dissent"9 the Confederated Salish and
Kootenai court has taken the unusual step of agreeing to rehear part
of the principal case.
Dissenting District Judge Russell Smith found it to be:
self-evident that if a non-Indian is required to pay a larger load of
state and local taxes to provide services for the Indian who, because
of his race, is exempt from those taxes, then the non-Indian has been
subjected to a racial discrimination and deprived of equal protection
of the laws. The cases dealing with the subject of Indians and state
taxation have not explored this side of the coin. I think it must be
explored before a conclusion can be reached in this case.'

The dissent would hold that the Indians on the Flathead Reservation are sufficiently within Montana's jurisdiction to be entitled to state
services and, except for trust land, to be subject to state taxation. Thus the
Indians' being exempted from payment of the Montana tax solely on
the ground of being Indian places an unequal tax burden on the nonIndians. The conclusion being "race alone could never be a valid basis
for classification."'"

on the Reservation has the same statutory exemption as the Licensed Indian Trader.
Mr. Tonasket was a full blood Indian see Tonasket, supra note 32) and the Bureau
of Indian Affairs reasoned that he did not need the Federal License because of his
heritage. The factor was mentioned by the Washington court on its reconsideration
of the cigarette tax question.
"Williams v. Lee, supra note 18. A consideration which was mentioned in both the
principal case and McClanahan is the extent of state services supplied to Reservation
Indians and the concomitant federal subsidy in the maintenance of such services.
"Williams v. Lee, supra note 18.
r"Id.
"MeClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Arizona, supra note 3.
"Confederated Salish and Kootenai v. Moe, supra note 1 at 428.
sId.
"Id. at 434.
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The conclusion which Judge Smith reaches, that race is not a basis
for tax classification, is undoubtedy tautological. But, is race the sole
criterion of the special status given to the relation of Indians and
states by the federal courts?
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